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Abstract: Previous research has discovered a curious phenomenon: groups cooperate less 
than individuals in a deterministic prisoner's dilemma game but cooperate more than 
individuals when uncertainty is introduced into the game. We conduct two studies to 
examine three possible processes that may have driven groups to be more cooperative 
than individuals to reduce risks: group risk concern, group cooperation expectation, and 
social pressure. We find that ex-post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance under 
uncertainty cause group members to be more risk concerned than individuals. This 
concern drives groups to choose the cooperation (and risk-reduction) strategy more 
frequently than individuals do. Groups also have higher cooperation expectations for the 
other group than individuals have for the other individual. We find no evidence of social 
pressure pushing groups to be nicer and more cooperative than individuals. 
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1. Introduction  
We recently reported a curious phenomenon in comparing group decisions with 
those of individuals in a game theoretic setting. In a deterministic prisoner's dilemma 
(DPD) game, 3-person groups cooperated less than did individuals (32% vs. 78%), but 
cooperated more than individuals in a stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD) game (52% 
vs. 22%) (Gong et al., 2009). In these two-agent controlled laboratory experiments, 
groups always played against another group, and an individual against another individual. 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the payoff matrices for the SPD game and DPD game 
respectively where a cooperative decision is one where the agent invests in protection. 
Negative numbers represent losses. Percentages are probabilities of various outcomes as a 
function of the specific decision by each of the agents. The expected values in the SPD 
game are the corresponding values in the DPD game. The Nash equilibrium, assuming 
risk neutrality and using maximization of expected values as a criterion for choosing 
between alternatives is (Not Invest, Not Invest).  
 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 
 
In the SPD game, each agent (i.e. a three-person group or an individual) decides 
whether or not to pay an investment cost (45) to reduce its own risk of experiencing a 
larger loss (100). If one agent invests, both agents’ likelihoods of suffering a loss are 
reduced, but the investor's risk is reduced more than her counterpart's (from 52% to 20% 
vs. from 52% to 40%). Joint cooperation (both investing) eliminates uncertainty 
completely and each player incurs only the cost of investment cost only.  
 
The stochastic prisoner's dilemma (SPD) is a special case of an interdependent 
security game (Heal and Kunreuther, 2007), which characterizes a variety of problems in 
the real world, such as airline security (e.g., the Pan Am 103 crash), emission reduction 
by multiple nationals in the global warming problem, bankruptcy of an entire company 
caused by a catastrophic loss from one of its divisions, etc. In the latter connection a 
recent example is the potential collapse of the American International Group (A.I.G.), the 
world's largest insurer, during the financial crisis of 2008, which was the result of a 377-
person London Unit known as A.I.G. Financial Products that was run with almost 
complete autonomy from the parent company (Kunreuther 2009).  
 
There were two interesting group-individual differences in Gong et al. (2009). 
First, groups cooperated less than individuals in the DPD game. This behavior is 
consistent with a well replicated phenomenon in social psychology that groups are 
usually more competitive and less cooperative than individuals in the context of mixed-
motive matrix games, such as the prisoner's dilemma. In social psychology, this group-
being-more-competitive-than-individual phenomenon is termed the ``intergroup 
interindividual discontinuity effect'' (for a review of studies on this behavior see 
Wildschut and Insko, 2007).  
 
Second, when uncertainty is introduced into the SPD game, the discontinuity 
effect not only disappeared but also was reversed: groups were now more cooperative 
than individuals. Data analysis on participants' strategies, survey questionnaires, and 
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recorded discussions in Gong et al. (2009) revealed that three major factors (greed, fear, 
and persuasion power) that underlied the usual discontinuity effect were reduced in the 
stochastic environment.  
 
Note that, in the SPD game, uncertainty not only reduced inter-group 
competitiveness but also encouraged inter-group cooperativeness. Although some 
possible explanations were proposed for the group cooperativeness under uncertainty in 
Gong et al. (2009), we could not verify or refute any of them as they were based on 
previous literature rather than empirical studies.  
 
There are at least three reasons underlying an agent’s decision to invest in a SPD 
game. First, an agent may decide to invest to reduce her own risk because she has a high 
degree of risk aversion. As shown in Table 1 and 2, a risk neutral agent will never invest 
independent of her counterpart’s action. But a highly risk averse agent will invest even 
when she expects her counterpart not to invest if the agent’s risk preference is such that 
“paying the investment cost of 45” is worth more than “reducing the chance of losing 100 
from 52% to 20%.” 
 
The second reason for investing is that the agent trusts her counterpart to invest, 
and decides to cooperate so as to remove the risk. In this case the agent prefers to “pay 
the investment cost of 45” in order to “reduce the chance of losing 100 from 40% to 
zero”. If, however, the agent expects her counterpart not to invest, she will also not 
invest. She thinks that “paying the investment cost of 45” is not worth “reducing the 
chance of losing 100 from 52% to 20%.” 
 
The third reason why an agent cooperated in the SPD game is because she is 
concerned with the welfare of others which we term the niceness norm. In this case a 
person may decide to invest because paying the investment cost is worth a reduction in 
risk to both herself and her counterpart. 
 
This paper reports on two studies designed to determine the statistic significance 
and relative importance of each of the above three explanations regarding why groups 
cooperated in the SPD game. More specifically we tested three group processes that may 
lead groups to cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks: a group being more 
concerned with risks, having higher cooperation expectation of their counterpart group, 
and being under greater social pressure to conform to the niceness norm.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 present each of the two 
studies respectively by providing a rationale for the study, the experimental design, the 
results, and a discussion of the findings. Study I examines whether groups and 
individuals have different risk preferences. Study II is a comprehensive survey that 
examines the rationale for cooperation by focusing on possible group-individual 
differences in cooperation expectation and social pressure to conform to various norms. 
Section 4 examines the strengths and weaknesses of current studies, and concludes by 
suggesting future research directions.   
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2. Study I: Group-individual Risk Preference Difference    
 
2.1 Rationale for the Study  
 
Previous research has shown that people suffer from guilty feelings if they inflict 
harm on others (Baumeister et al., 1994). Charness and his coauthors found that people 
tried to live up to others' expectations to avoid guilt (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). In 
Charness and Jackson (2009), 90% of participants whose decisions were affected by 
having a silent partner played a less risky strategy when choosing for themselves and 
their partner than when playing only for themselves so to avoid ex-post guilt. Group 
members may also choose to cooperate to reduce risks in an effort to avoid ex-post blame 
(Gong et al., 2009). If one group member suggests Not Invest and a large loss occurs 
later, then other group members may blame her for the loss. 
 
In the SPD game, although cooperation (Investing) has a lower expected payoff 
than defection (Not Investing), cooperation reduces the risk of the agent suffering a larger 
loss and is considered a safer option than defection. Hence, both guilt aversion and blame 
avoidance encourage group members to choose cooperation, the safer strategy. 
  
2.2 Study Design  
 
The Game. In Study I, participants played the same SPD game shown in Table 1 
and were aware that they were playing against a computerized agent that was 
programmed to invest with certain probabilities. The probabilities were known to the 
players before they made their decisions as to whether to Invest or Not Invest. This 
design adopted the basic structure and incentives of the SPD game, but removed any 
interactive motivations for cooperation, such as expectation of future cooperation or 
social pressure to be nice. The only benefit from an agent’s investment was to reduce her 
own probability of suffering a loss. Investment by a human agent had no effect on the 
decision of the computer or on potential future benefits from mutual cooperation. The 
investment difference between groups and individuals in this game should thus be 
completely determined by their differences in risk preference.  
 
Each player played multiple Supergames, each consisting of ten rounds. At the 
beginning of each Supergame, players were given 1500 Talers; one Taler was 
exchangeable for 2 cents in the individual condition, and 6 cents in the group condition 
divided equally between the three group members. Money accumulated from a previous 
Supergame did not carry over to the next one. The probabilities in each round that the 
computer was likely to invest were selected based on the average investment tendency of 
real players in Gong et al. (2009) and are shown in Table 3. 
  
--Insert Table 3 here-- 
 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis of interest concerns the group-individual risk 
preference difference discussed in Section 2.1. We will refer it as the `group risk concern 
hypothesis:  
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H1 (group risk concern hypothesis): Groups are more risk concerned and invest 
more frequently to reduce risks than individuals do in an SPD game when both groups 
and individuals play against a computer with a known probability of investing.  
 
Participants. 182 people participated in a between-subject study. 150 were in the 
Group condition (50 groups in total), and 32 were in the Individual condition. All were 
paid a $10 show-up fee. About 20% of the participants were randomly chosen to be paid 
the dollar values of Talers they earned in Study I.  
 
Procedure. The study was conducted in a behavioral lab of a northeastern 
university using Z-tree, a software for developing economic experiments (Fischbacher, 
2007). There were two kinds of players: individuals and groups. Participants played the 
game either as a member of a 3-person group or an individual. In the group experiment 
the three group members made a collective decision and shared the final payoffs equally 
among themselves. Participants were instructed to make unanimous decisions or use a 2 
to 1 majority rule.  
 
Each individual or group used one computer to make its decisions. The 
computers were placed in two connecting rooms and in separate stations surrounded by 
cardboards to provide anonymity. Subjects were approximately 6 feet apart. All 
participants were aware that they would play against a computer whose investing 
probabilities were known to them before they made their own decisions.  
 
Participants were told at the beginning of the experiment that their payoffs would 
be based on a show-up fee ($10) and might also be based on their performance in the 
game. All participants were asked to complete a quiz that contained a variety of questions 
regarding the game, the procedure, decision method, payment information etc., before 
they started playing the game.  
 
2.3 Results  
 
When facing a computer player whose investing probability was known, groups 
invested 38% of the time, and individuals invested 29% of the time. A logit regression 
confirmed that groups invested more frequently than individuals (z=2.25, p<0.05), 
supporting H1 that groups were more risk concerned than individuals in the SPD game1.  
 
More details on the investment decisions of groups and individuals in each round 
are illustrated in Figure 1. Besides supporting H1, Study I also revealed a few other 
interesting perspectives in groups and individuals’ decision on risk management when 
playing with a computerized agent. 
 
First, although there was no interaction between the participants and the 
computer player, Figure 1 implies that participants responded to the investment 
probability changes of the computer over time as if there had been an interaction. The 
investment tendency of both groups and individuals decreased as the probability of 
                                                 
1 The group risk concern hypothesis was also confirmed in another independent study (Gong, 2009).  
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computer investing decreased. One possible reason for this behavior is that participants 
might focus on the likelihood of investing so as to reduce the risk to zero, which is 
consistent with previous research on the desire of zero risk (Viscusi et al., 1987). When 
there was a higher probability that the computer would invest, it was more likely that the 
participants could completely remove the risk of losing 100 Talers by investing 45 Talers. 
When the computer’s investment probability was low, however, the participants realized 
that investing 45 Talers by themselves would be unlikely to reduce the risk to zero.  
 
--Insert Figure 1 here -- 
 
Second, although both groups and individuals responded to the probability 
changes, there are a few noticeable group-individual differences in terms of how they 
responded to the changes in the computer’s decision to invest. As stated before, in 
general groups invested significantly more frequently than individuals, which supports 
H1. But the group-individual risk preference difference was not always of the same 
magnitude in all rounds with different investment probabilities. As shown in Figure 1, 
when the computer’s probability of investing was high (Round 1 and 2), roughly the 
same percentage (around 40%) of the groups and individuals thought that it was worth 45 
Talers to have a high chance of removing the risk completely. As the probability of the 
computer investing and likelihood of removing the risk decreased (Round 3--8), groups 
and individuals illustrated different risk reduction tendencies. A higher percentage of 
groups than individuals chose to invest to reduce their own risk, even though they knew 
that the computer's probability of investing was low, which is also consistent with H1 that 
groups are more concerned about risks than individuals.  
 
Third, the investment difference between groups and individuals in Study I (38% 
vs. 29%) was much smaller than that in Gong et al. (2009) (52% vs. 22%). The difference 
in the magnitude may imply that group risk reduction in the SPD game only partially 
explains the group cooperativeness. Another limitation of Study I is that, although it 
confirmed that groups are more risk-concerned than individuals, it did not provide 
specific information as to whether the group risk concern was driven by guilt aversion or 
blame avoidance or other unidentified factors.  
 
3. Study II: A Survey Study on the SPD game  
 
Study II was designed to investigate two other group processes that might have 
motivated groups to invest in the SPD game: the group cooperation-expectation 
hypothesis and the social norm hypothesis. We also examine underlying motivations for 
groups to become more risk concerned than individuals.  
 
3.1 Rationale and Hypotheses 
 
3.1.1 The Group Cooperation-Expectation Hypothesis 
 
Besides the group risk concern explanation confirmed in Study 1, another reason 
why groups may have cooperated more than individuals in the SPD game is that groups 
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may have higher expectations that their counterpart would invest than individuals after 
observing their own groups’ high risk concern and cooperation tendency, and 
generalizing that to the other group.  
 
H2 (group cooperation-expectation hypothesis): Groups have higher cooperation 
expectation for their counterpart groups than individuals have for their counterpart 
individuals under uncertainty. 
 
Note that, the cooperation expectation argument (H2) is related to risk 
preference hypothesis (H1), and explains group cooperation under uncertainty from a 
different perspective than the risk concern argument, risk concern is based on whether 
''acting as a group under uncertainty'' pushes group members to be more focused on the 
likelihood and consequences of experiencing a loss, while the cooperation expectation 
argument considers whether ''interacting with another group (rather than another 
individual) under uncertainty'' changes players expectation as to how likely their 
counterpart will cooperate.    
 
3.1.2 The Social Norm Hypothesis 
 
The third potential explanation as to why groups cooperate more than individuals 
in the SPD game is that group members are under social pressure from other members to 
conform to certain social norms, especially the niceness norm which encourages 
cooperation. 
 
When people are in a group and their behavior is observable to others, they are 
often under pressure to conform to social norms (see Turner, 1991 for a review on social 
conformity). In an interactive game such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, three norms are 
especially relevant: the norm of being pro-group (Tajfel, 1982), the norm of being smart 
(Orbell and Dawes, 1981), and the norm of being nice (Dawes 1980). For a more detailed 
discussion on these three norms in both DPD and SPD game, see Gong et al. (2009).  
 
With uncertainty in the outcomes, there is no clear answer as to which strategy,  
Invest or Not Invest, is pro-group or smart. Defection has a higher expected payoff and 
may be regarded as a pro-group and smart strategy by some members. Other members 
may disagree because they are unwilling to take the risk associated with defection 
contending that cooperation reduces the risk and is thus a pro-group and smart strategy. 
The third norm, the niceness norm, clearly indicates that cooperation yields mutual 
benefits. We argue that it is possible that in the SPD game when defection cannot be 
easily justified by being pro-group and being smart, social pressure pushes group 
members to conform to the niceness and cooperation norm. This might be a third reason 
why groups may cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks. Thus, we test the 
following niceness norm hypothesis in Study II: 
 
H3 (group niceness norm hypothesis): Group members are under greater social 
pressure (than individuals) to be nice and report “being nice” to be one reason why they 
choose to invest.    
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Besides the niceness norm hypothesis, we will also test whether group members 
are under greater social pressure than individuals to conform to a variety of other norms 
to shed more light on group decision process in the SPD game.  
 
3.1.3 Motivations underlying Group Risk Concern 
 
A third purpose of Study II is to investigate the underlying motivations that drive 
groups to be cautious about risks. We do this by asking group members to identify 
reasons why they do not suggest or defend defection strategy (Not Invest) even though 
they personally believe that defection is a good strategy. The study is thus designed to 
complement Study I which provided confirmation of the group risk concern hypothesis 
(H1) but did not provide specific information as to whether the group risk concern was 
driven by guilt aversion, blame avoidance, or other factors. Specifically we will test the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Group members identify ex-post guilt aversion as one of the reasons why 
they do not suggest or defend defection. 
H1b: Group members identify ex-post blame avoidance as one of the reasons 
why they do not suggest or defend defection. 
 
In summary, we attempt to answer the following questions in Study II: 1) Do 
groups have higher cooperation expectation of their counterparts than individuals have? 
2) Does group membership or group process put social pressure on group members to 
conform to certain norms? If yes, what are they? Are group members under social 
pressure from other members to conform to the niceness norm that encourages 
cooperation? 3) What factors drive the group-individual risk preference difference? 
Specifically, do ex-post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance prevent group 
member from suggesting Not Invest and cooperate (Invest) more frequently to reduce the 
risk? 
 
3.2 Participants and Design  
 
There were three conditions in Study II, Individual Survey (IS), Group Private 
Survey (GPS), and Group Shared Survey (GSS). There were 32 participants in the IS 
condition, 72 participants (24 groups) in the GPS condition, and 78 participants (26 
groups) in the GSS condition (total, 182).  
 
In the IS condition, all participants first read the instructions for the SPD game in 
Table 1, finished the quiz, then completed a survey that contained a series of questions on 
their strategy choice, expectation of their counterpart, and social preferences. In the two 
group conditions (GPS and GSS), participants were assigned to 3-person groups, briefly 
met the other members, then were led to relatively private locations to read the 
instructions, finish the quiz, and complete the survey independently. The survey in the 
group condition included questions similar to the ones in the individual survey, plus a set 
of group-process-related questions.  
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In the GPS condition, the participants were told that, upon the completion of the 
survey, the experimenter would collect the survey sheets before they rejoined their 
groups to discuss the strategies and play the game. That is, their survey results would 
remain private and other members in their groups would not see their answers. In the 
GSS condition, the participants were told that they would bring their surveys and share 
them with their group members later when they rejoined the group to play the game. Note 
that all participants answered the survey questions before they actually participated in a 
group discussion or played the game.  
 
The initial motivation to have both private and shared group surveys was to 
distinguish between “group membership alone” and “group membership plus peer 
pressure.” However, even in the GPS condition, the social pressure to conform to certain 
norms was not completely removed because group members might foresee intragroup 
discussion even though their survey would remain private. Such anticipation might lead 
them to take the perspective of being part of a group. Possibly for that reason, we did not 
observe statistically significant differences between the GPS and GSS conditions. Hence 
the data from the two surveys were pooled for the analysis on group-individual 
differences.  
 
3.3 Results and Discussion  
 
To test the group cooperation-expectation hypothesis, we asked all players to 
estimate how likely they thought their counterpart would invest in the first round using a 
100-point scale ranging from 0 (my counterpart will never invest) to 100 (my counterpart 
will always invest). Consistent with H2, groups showed a significantly higher expectation 
that their counterpart would invest than individuals did (64 vs. 54, t(180)=1.63, p=0.05 
one-tail t-test). Note that this difference could be magnified in later rounds because the 
first-round decision based on the first-round expectation set the players’ initial tendency 
to cooperate and could have an impact on the general strategy the players adopted in later 
rounds of the game. 
 
To investigate whether being in a group imposed extra social pressure to 
conform to certain social norms, participants were asked to rate two sets of norms on a 0-
-100 scale where 0 represents ``it does not describe me in any situation'' and 100 
represents ``it describes me in all situations.'' The first set was four positive norms: desire 
to be regarded as being smart, being a team player, being nice, and working hard. The 
second set was four negative norms: desire not to be regarded as being selfish, being 
gullible, being incompetent, and being lazy.  
 
We ran a logit regression using the player type (group or individual) as the 
dependent variable, and 8 social norm questions as independent variables, then performed 
an ANOVA based on the logit regression. No significant difference between group 
members and individuals were found (χ2 (8)=11.29, p>0.10), which indicated that at least 
before group discussion, social norms did not appear to play a role in the SPD game. This 
finding does not support H3 which proposes that the niceness norm plays a role in 
leading groups to cooperate.  
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We examine H1a and H1b in a set of questions about why group members 
hesitated to suggest or defend defection when other members made a cooperative 
suggestion in the SPD game. In other words, what factors drive groups to be cautious 
about risks and choose the cooperative and risk-reduction strategy (Invest) over the 
defective and expected-payoff dominant strategy (Not Invest)? Seventy-seven out of 150 
group members indicated that they would not suggest or defend defection because they 
believed that defection was a bad strategy. What is more interesting is why the other 83 
group members who believed that defection was a good strategy, would not promote the 
defective strategy. Those group members were asked to choose reasons for not 
suggesting or defending defection on a series of closed-ended ratings, followed by one 
open-ended question for any reasons that might have been missing in the closed-ending 
ratings. Several participants answered the open-ended question, but their answers were 
reflected closed-ended options and were transformed into closed-ending answers.  
 
Table 4 shows the importance of each of the five reasons for participants not 
suggesting or defending defection. Note that the percentages sum to more than 100 
percent because participants were asked to identify all applicable reasons for their 
behavior.  
 
--Insert Table 4 here-- 
 
As shown in Table 4, guilt aversion (54%) and blame avoidance (69%), turned 
out to be two major motivations for not defecting, thus providing support for H1a and 
H1b, This finding is consistent with previous research (Baumeister et al. 1994; Charness 
and Jackson, 2009) and suggests why groups choose cooperation more frequently than 
individuals do. Again, there was little evidence supporting H3 that group members did 
not suggest defection (Not Invest) because of violating the niceness norm (4%). 
 
5. General Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Previous research has shown that groups are usually less cooperative than 
individuals in prisoner's dilemma games. This well-replicated phenomenon is termed the 
“discontinuity effect.” In a recent paper, we replicated the discontinuity effect that groups 
cooperated less than individuals in a deterministic Prisoner's Dilemma game, but found a 
reversed discontinuity effect that groups cooperated more than individuals in a stochastic 
version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which cooperation reduces risks (Gong et al., 
2009).  
 
The current paper extends the research on group cooperation under uncertainty 
by investigating the rationale underlying group behavior. Two studies examined the 
following possible reasons for group-individual cooperation differences under 
uncertainty: risk preference differences, cooperation expectation difference, and social 
pressure in groups to conform to social norms.  
 
These two studies reveal that guilt aversion and blame avoidance drove group 
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members to be more cautious and have higher risk concern than individuals. Hence it was 
more likely for groups to cooperate and invest so as to reduce their risk than individuals 
did. Groups also have a greater expectation of cooperation of their counterpart groups 
than individuals did of their counterparts. This is probably due to groups generalizing 
their own high risk aversion and cooperation tendency to their counterparts. The current 
studies show no evidence of social pressure pushing groups to be nicer and more 
cooperative than individuals.  
 
The finding that guilt aversion and blame avoidance encourage groups to 
cooperate has important policy implications. To illustrate, imagine that two villages are 
located close to a lake and households in each village need to make a decision as to 
whether they are willing to pay a cost to get their waste disposed or directly dump their 
refuse into the lake, thus increasing the health risk for all households. According to the 
findings from Studies I and II, the two villages have a better chance of protecting the lake 
from being polluted if they each established a committee to make a collective decision 
rather than having each household make individual decisions. Similar reasoning can be 
applied to numerous scenarios in which there is an interdependent security problem and 
cooperation reduces each other’s risks. Under those circumstances, groups have a better 
chance of cooperating and hence managing their risks more efficiently. This may also 
partly explains why people consistently trust groups over individuals on important 
decisions, in spite of the well-known fact in social psychology that groups are usually 
worse than individuals in terms of cooperation. 
 
The group risk concern phenomenon is also of theoretical interest, because our 
finding conflicts with a well-known phenomenon in social psychology called group risk 
polarization or the risky shift, which states that there is a tendency for groups to behave 
in a more extreme manner than if individual members made choices on their own. Groups 
will become more risk averse only if individual members have a risk-averse tendency. If, 
however, individual members initially prefer risk-seeking, groups will be more risk 
seeking than individuals.  
   
The group polarization prediction is inconsistent with behavior in Study I in 
which individuals invested 29% of the time to reduce risks and groups invested 38% of 
the time. Group polarization theory would have predicted that groups invest less than 
29% of the time. There are at least two possible reasons for why group polarization fails 
to predict group risk concern in the current game. First, groups in the polarization studies 
are usually asked to report their risk preferences only, while in the current study groups 
can take an active role in reducing risks. Second, previous group polarization involves no 
interaction between groups, while the current study is an interactive and strategic game. 
Although a detailed discussion on the congruency and disparity between group risk 
concern and group risk polarization is beyond the scope of this paper, one of the authors 
is conducting a series of studies to further investigate the phenomenon.  
 
One question that needs to investigated in future research is “when do groups 
cooperate more than individuals?”, or the generality question. The game we have been 
using involves several unique features that may affect decisions regarding group 
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cooperation so one needs to be cautious in generalizing to other situations. For example, 
the current study involved a game with negative outcomes in which players invest to 
reduce the risks of suffering a loss. It is unclear what would happen in an investment 
game with positive outcomes. Researchers have found that people encode losses and 
gains differently (Seymour et al., 2007) and typically show greater sensitivity to losses 
than to gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The guilt-aversion and blame-avoidance 
motivations underlying the reversed discontinuity effect may be stronger in a loss-domain 
game than in a gain-domain game because, if a loss occurred, the regret from not 
investing in risk-reducing measures is likely to be larger than if additional revenue could 
have been earned from investing in a profit-enhancing measure in a gain-domain game. It 
will be interesting to test whether there is a triple interaction between the loss/gain 
domain, the group/individual player type, and the DPD/SPD game type. 
 
The nature of the uncertainty is another factor that may interact with group 
cooperation. As shown in Table 1, in the upper left cell, both players investing can 
completely remove the uncertainty. What if the risk is irremovable? For example, many 
environmental risks have two parts, uncertainty due to nature, and uncertainty due to 
human activity. Even if one stopped emitting greenhouse gases immediately, it is likely 
that global warming will still occur. Based on previous discussion, we would expect the 
level of guilt aversion and blame avoidance to be lower because there is no longer an 
outcome that has zero risk. Thus, we may expect to see lower risk-reduction driven 
cooperative behavior from groups. 
  
There are other factors that may have an effect on group cooperation decisions, 
including, but not exclusive to, leadership of the groups, existence of competition with a 
group, group decision making (voting) rules, the length of the game, communication 
between players, the incentive structure of the game, the number of players, etc.  
 
Group cooperation under uncertainty is a new phenomenon with many perspectives 
remaining to be explored. Better understanding the phenomenon will have broad 
implications for developing risk management strategies for important societal problems 
with interconnected networks for improving individual/group and social welfare.   
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Table 1: Possible outcomes in the SPD game 
 Player 2 
Invest Not Invest 
Player 
1 
Invest -45; -45 20% lose 145,80% lose 
45;  
40% lose 100,60% lose 
0   
Not Invest 40% lose 100,60% 
lose 0; 
20% lose 145,80% 
lose 45 
52% lose 100,48% lose 
0; 
52% lose 100,48% lose 
0 
 
Table 2: Possible outcomes in the DPD game 
 Player 2 
Invest Not Invest
Player 1 
Invest -45;- 45 -65;- 40  
Not Invest -40;- 65 -52;- 52 
 
Table 3: Invest Probabilities of the Computer Player in Study I 
Round Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probability of 
Investing 
60% 55% 54% 53% 50% 49% 47% 42% 31% 17%
 
 
Table 4: Reasons for Not Suggesting Defection in Study II 
 
Blame Avoidance 69% 
Guilt Aversion 54% 
Persuasion Concern 30% 
Does Not Care Enough 25% 
Niceness Norm 4% 
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Figure 1: Group-Individual Investments when Playing with a Computer in Study I 
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